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Nous étudions l’influence de l’application de la législation du travail sur l’emploi tirant partie d’une 
base de données recensant les plaintes prud’homales de 1990 à 2004. Nous montrons à l’aide d’un 
modèle théorique simple qu’un grand nombre de plaintes ne s’interprète pas forcément comme une 
législation plus restrictive. Il peut être la résultante des faibles coûts supportés par l’entreprise pour 
aller en justice en comparaison d’un licenciement en bonne et due forme ou bien la conséquence de 
coûts réduits pour le salarié qui serait tenté de poursuivre l’entreprise quelque soit le bien fondé du 
grief.  Ensuite,  nous  montrons  empiriquement  que  les  décisions  prud’homales  influencent  les  flux 
d’emplois et cela en corrigeant grâce au schéma institutionnel français d’une causalité inverse allant de 
la  situation  du  marché  du  travail  à  la  nature  des  décisions  prud’homales.  Davantage  de  plaintes 
abandonnées et de procès augmentent les destructions d’emploi : les procès correspondraient donc  à 
des  coûts  de  licenciement  plus  faibles.  Au  contraire,  davantage  de  négociations,   de  recours  et 
d’avocats  représentant  les  salariés  réduisent  les  destructions  d’emploi.  Une  implantation  locale 
importante des prudhommes limite les créations d’emploi en particulier celles engendrées par des 
créations d’entreprises. 
 
Classification JEL: J32, J53, J63, K31 






Using a data set of individual labor disputes brought to court over the years 1990 to 2003 in France, 
we examine the impact of the enforcement of Employment Protection Legislation on labor market 
outcomes. First, we present a simple theoretical model showing that judicial case outcomes cannot be 
directly interpreted in terms of EPL. A large fraction of cases that go to trials may well be a sign of 
low firing costs when firms face low litigation costs and are therefore willing to go to court or a sign 
of high firing costs when workers face low litigation costs and are therefore willing to sue the firm. 
Second, we exploit our model as well as the French institutional setting to generate instruments for 
these endogenous outcomes. Using these instruments, we show that labor courts decisions have a 
causal effect on labor flows. More dropped cases and more trials cause more job destructions: more 
trials indeed are a sign of lower separation costs. More settlements, higher filing rates, a larger fraction 
of workers represented at trial, large lawyer density dampen job destruction. A larger judge density 
causes less job creation, in particular on the extensive margin. 
 
JEL classification: J32, J53, J63, K31 
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1  Introduction 
 
The effects of employment protection legislation (EPL, hereafter) on labor markets have mostly been 
examined through changes in the legislation (see for instance Autor, Donohue, and Schwab, 2006 for 
the impact of exceptions to the employment-at-will in the US). However, enforcement of the law may 
matter more than its content (see for example Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2005 who find that insider 
trading  laws  decrease  the  cost  of  equity  only  when  a  case  has  been  prosecuted).  Moreover,  a 
legislative text never exists in isolation but within a web of texts. Therefore, any alteration of the law 
in one dimension is likely to have an impact in other dimensions and each law must be considered as 
embedded in the legal system (see for example Autor, 2003 who shows how changes in the “Unjust 
Dismissal Doctrine” impacted the temporary help industry in the United States).   
 
The  French  EPL  system  characterized  by  large  separation  costs,  high  coverage  by  collective 
bargaining agreements, powerful unions is usually considered by international organizations as one of 
the strictest. It also produces every year a large amount of legal procedures related to individual labor 
disputes (roughly 160,000 new cases every year, as we will see). These procedures are complex, 
costly, and can last for years. It is these legal procedures that we analyze in this paper. We examine 
their impact on employment flows. However, in contrast with virtually all of the literature, we do not 
focus on legislation changes but on the judicial process itself. We measure labor courts outcomes – 
workers’  or  firms’  victories,  conciliations…  --  directly  using  all  cases  that  took  place  in  France 
between 1990 and 2003. We relate these outcomes to the legal environment of each French labor 
court. We then try to understand how these legal outcomes affect job creation and job destruction 
within the jurisdiction of each court, using flows measured at those establishments that are within the 
jurisdiction of each court.  
 
This  strategy  is,  we  believe,  better  suited  to  measuring  and  identifying  real  EPL  since  the  mere 
wording of a new legislative text often tells little about its real impact. We build a model relating 
firing costs to judicial activities of the courts. The model as well as data will help us show how 
changes in the legislative environment that directly affect the legal costs of going to court transform 
the whole structure of potential labor courts outcomes. Because we want to relate legal case outcomes 
with EPL, our contribution to the literature has to be both methodological and empirical.  
 
On the methodology side, we define here increasing EPL uniquely by increasing separations costs. 
Endowed with this definition, and using Bentolila and Bertola (1993)’s very general result that an 
increase in separation costs decreases labor flows (both at entry and at exit), we are in position to 
identify those legal outcomes of labor courts that constitute real measures of EPL as those that 
decrease labor flows. Indeed, we show theoretically and empirically that some features of legislation   4 
that are, apparently, helping workers have the exact opposite effect and decrease separations costs. 
The main reason for such a surprising result comes from composition effects. These composition 
effects have direct consequences on final separation costs: for instance, if only “expensive” cases 
come to court, on one side the firm economizes on the extensive margin (less cases) but pays more on 
the intensive margin (more expensive). Therefore, measured case outcomes do not have a simple and 
univocal interpretation in terms of separation costs: more trials may sometimes mean larger separation 
costs, but it may also mean lower separation costs. This result does not only apply to labor courts but 
also to divorce or more generally to any legislation that alters the decisions of workers, couples, firms 
when they contract, sue, or indeed go to court.
2 
 
On the empirical side, our contribution is threefold. First, we consider measures of EPL varying across 
space  and  time  based  on  the  various  measures  of  judicial  cases  outcomes  directly  coming  from 
legislation enforcement. In France, workers can contest the conditions of a firing by filing a case to 
one of the 264 local labor courts. We use information collected by the French Ministry of Justice on 
all cases that were filed over the 1990-2004 period (2 millions of cases) to compute, at the local level 
of the court and for each year, various EPL indicators characterizing the enforcement of the labor 
laws: fraction of cases leading to a conciliation between parties, to a trial, resulting in a worker’s 
victory, to a case dismissed by the court, or the fraction of cases in which workers or firms were 
legally represented. We match these local indicators with local measures of the legal environment 
(judges,  administrative  staff,  lawyers…)  as  well  as  local  measures  of  job  flows  à  la  Davis  and 
Haltiwanger (distinguishing in particular the extensive and the intensive margins). Second, as we work 
at the level of France, a country in which many institutions are centralized and do not vary across the 
French  territory  (minimum  wage,  unemployment  benefits,  wage  bargaining…)  we  are  able  to 
“control” for most of the French labor market institutions, even though there is enough variation 
between as well as within local labor courts. Third, thanks to the precise French institutional setting 
and  those  local  measures  of  legal  environment,  we  use  various  empirical  strategies  (geographic 
discontinuities, exogenously set environment, instruments) to correct for the endogeneity from which 
estimation of the relation between economic conditions, including labor flows, and application of the 
labor laws might suffer. Then, we show the magnitude of various court outcomes on employment 
flows, identifying in so doing those that are valid measures of increasing EPL and those that are not. 
 
As in all of the empirical papers we are aware of, our paper focuses on the impact of labor regulations 
on labor market characteristics and leave aside the welfare gains from job stability which must be 
taken into account for policy recommendations.
3 We also do not assess the impacts of the enforcement 
                                                 
2 This has not escaped some analysts; see for instance Stevenson (2007) on legislation and divorce rates. 
3 See Bertola (2003) for a theoretical model considering risk-averse workers and potential positive effect of EPL 
on welfare.   5 
of EPL on productivity and wages. However, and in contrast with the existing empirical literature, our 
labor court outcomes capture some dimensions of the quality of labor relations which according to 
Blanchard and Philippon (2004) or Algan and Cahuc (2007) are related to the evolution of labor 
market conditions.  
 
 Related  literature:  In  a  seminal  paper,  Lazear  (1990),  who  used  unemployment  benefits  and 
severance  payments  given  to  a  blue  collar  with  10  years  of  service  as  a  proxy  for  labor  market 
flexibility, acknowledges that high overall labor market flexibility can prevail without being captured 
by any of these two variables. Hence, one might conclude with Freeman (2004) that cross-country 
analyses  are  hardly  convincing  since  “with  only  30  or  so  advanced  countries,  highly  correlated 
outcomes, and infrequent changes in institutions, the number of configurations can easily exceed the 
number  of  independent  data  points”.  Moreover,  in  these  cross-country  analyses,  the  typical  EPL 
indices  are  deemed  exogenous  and  imperfectly  capture  how  the  behaviors  of  unions,  employer 
federations, or government regulators change over time.  
 
Taking stock of these critiques, a recent strand of literature has assessed the impact of EPL within 
countries. This strategy typically involves measuring the impact of a change in legislation targeted to a 
specific category within a whole country or -- in the case of the US -- the impact of the differential 
timing in the introduction of a new EPL across different states. Wrongful-discharge protections were 
adopted by US state courts during the last three decades. Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2004) take 
advantage of the between-state variation in the timing of the introduction of these labor laws and 
estimate their impact using difference-in-difference estimators. The “implied-contract” exception law, 
meaning that the employer implicitly promised not to terminate a worker without good cause, is found 
to have reduced state employment rate by 0.8 to 1.6%. Boeri and Jimeno (2003), using the 1990s 
tightening of the Italian regulation for firms with less than 15 employees, find that the threshold does 
matter in conditioning layoff and hiring probabilities but find no significant impact on employment 
growth. Bauer et al. (2007) find no effect of the change in the German EPL exemption for small firms 
on worker turnover. Martins (2009) reaches the same conclusion using Portuguese matched employer-
employee data. 
 
Unfortunately, this last strand of research suffers from several downsides as well. First, these studies 
do not provide information concerning the degree of enforcement of labor regulations. To which 
extent these regulations were used by workers to defend their own interests? Are these regulations 
actually binding for employers? For instance, in the case of the US, even if judicial breaches to the 
employment-at-will doctrine have been judged by some state courts, we have little evidence on the 
extent to which they are used or even known by the workers. Therefore, we do not know if they act as 
a credible threat to the employment-at-will policy. The state of California recognized the application   6 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment relationships in 1980. In March and 
April 1986, about 100 cases were filed in Los Angeles which implies an approximate number of 1,000 
for the entire year in the entire state
4 (hence, about 80 cases per million workers).
5 In comparison, for 
France, with a population and GDP close to those of California, 160,000 cases take place in any given 
year. Of course, one could argue that the law can act on the employer in a pre-emptive way but, to 
capture  any  effect  in  the  data,  this  impact  should  be  very  strong  (or  conversely  the  impact  on 
employment of labor courts should be extreme in France). Second, labor laws are subject to court 
interpretation and tend to vary over time and space. As pointed out by The OECD 2004 Employment 
Outlook, even if an employer may be sanctioned in case of non-respect of EPL, “these provisions are 
subject to court interpretation and this may constitute a major (but often hidden) source of variation in 
EPL strictness both across countries and over time”.  In addition, methodologically, the timing of 
introduction of a new EPL can substantially alter the results. Indeed, Miles (2000) - using a different 
classification  of  cases  when  identifying  the  adoption  dates  -  finds  no  significant  effects.  Third, 
problems of endogeneity abound: court interpretation with the ensuing impact might not be exogenous 
as market conditions are likely to have an impact on the leniency of the courts, the introduction of new 
laws, or workers’ propensity to go to court. Ichino et al. (2003), using micro data on labor court cases, 
focus on this institutional endogeneity of EPL enforcement. Studying the case of an Italian bank with 
roughly 20,000 employees among which 409 workers were fired and 86 of them went to trial over 
more than 20 years, they show that a higher unemployment rate increases worker’s probability of 
winning her case. In contrast, Marinescu (2006) - using data from a 1992 survey of Employment 
Tribunal Applications in Great Britain - finds that a higher unemployment rate leads to more decisions 
against the workers, in particular when they were already re-employed. 
 
Section 2 describes the French labor courts institutional setting. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical 
model relating the judicial cases outcomes that result from the enforcement of labor laws to firing 
costs. Section 4 describes our data sets and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 5 explains our 
empirical methodology to capture EPL causal effects and presents our regression results on labor 




                                                 
4 In 1986, civil case filings in Los Angeles represented about 60% of all civil activity in the state of California. 
5 These figures are taken from Dertouzos (1986).   7 
2  Labor Courts in France: the Institutional Setting 
2.1  French Firing Laws  
 
Three types of events may trigger the firm’s decision to fire a worker: a grave misconduct, a lay-off 
due to a slowdown in the business activity, or an insufficient level of competence. Under the current 
French law, the separation should be declared as a redundancy (or economic dismissal). However, in 
France as in many European countries an economic dismissal may entail a more complicated and time 
consuming process as well as the payment of large severance fees. On the contrary, a dismissal for 
misconduct is a faster process - if not challenged by the worker or if confirmed by the labor court. 
Thus the dismissal for “just” cause implies a lower firing cost than a redundancy. When fired, a 
French worker might sue the firm. Since a bill passed in 1973, every individual dismissal must be 
justified by a “real and serious cause” and the firm has the burden of proof. Without delving deep into 
30 years of jurisprudence that have made this concept simultaneously blurred and precise, “real” 
means that the wrongdoing justifying the dismissal must be objectively defined, accurate, and in line 
with the mandatory firing notification letter. For example, being ten minutes late does not mean being 
seventy minutes late ; a lack of performance or a lack of trust is not considered as “real” if it is not 
objectively measured. The cause is considered as “serious” only if it is related to the professional 
activity of the worker and if it makes the labor relation impossible to continue. There are various 
degrees of “seriousness”. Some lead to “grave misconduct” (for example brawl or thievery) which 
allows the employer to totally deprive the worker of severance payment (in this case, the employee 
may lose her unemployment benefits).  
 
In addition to the cause of the dismissal, the employee can sue the employer if the latter did not follow 
the mandatory legal steps of the firing process (for example the employer must notify one week in 
advance that the employer intends to meet the worker in order to discuss his firing). 
 
As pointed out by Galdon-Sanchez and Guel (2003), EPL legislation in European countries may give 
rise to a double moral hazard problem: a worker fired for misconduct has an incentive to sue for unfair 
dismissal  and  a  firm  has  an  incentive  to  label  “misconduct”  a  separation  which,  in  reality,  is  a 
redundancy. Thus, even if this phenomenon is obviously hard to detect in the data, the proportion in 
France of dismissals for economic reasons decreased from 61% in 1993 to 24% in 2004.  
2.2  French Labor Courts  
 
The French labor justice is mainly dispensed by the “Prud’hommes” which is the relevant jurisdiction 
to every labor dispute arising at the individual level in France. There are several labor courts in each 
Prud’hommes. As the legislators wanted to take into account industry characteristics of the cases   8 
brought to court, each Prud’homme is divided into 4 sections according to the main activity of the 
firm: Agriculture, Retail Trade, Manufacturing, and Other Activities (mainly Services). A fifth section 
is dedicated to cases involving “managers, engineers, and professionals” irrespective of the activity of 
the firm. 
  
The judges in the Prud’hommes are not professional judges and can be seen as performing a public 
duty. Each labor court comprises judges representing employers and judges representing employees in 
equal number. These judges are elected every five years within lists established by workers unions and 
employer  federations.  All  employees  are  entitled  to  vote.  They  select  judges  in  the  union  lists. 
Similarly, employers vote and select judges within the federation lists. Hence, in every section of 
every Prud’homme, the number of judges is even, at least four on each side. All French establishments 
are allocated to one Prud’homme. On the employee side, the electoral body includes all private sector 
workers  with  a  labor  contract.  They  are  enrolled  on  the  electoral  list  based  on  a  mandatory 
administrative report from their employer. Unemployed can also vote but have to enroll on the list by 
themselves. On the employer side, in addition to employers and business owners, employees entitled 
to take firing or hiring decisions can also vote for employer representatives.  
 
Prud’hommes are supposedly not very formal and should be seen as conciliation boards. Prud’hommes 
were designed to foster agreements rather than trials. Therefore a first and mandatory step in each trial 
is a conciliation audience where plaintiffs and defenders explain their grievance and judges try to push 
for an agreement. If they do not, the case is judged. If, in the end, an equal number of judges decides 
in favor of a worker and against her, there is a tie (“solution de départage”). In this case, a single 
professional judge decides the outcome of the trial.  
 
In the 90’s, 264 Prud’hommes were spread all over metropolitan France, a labor court being at most 
within  a  radius  of  30  miles  from  any  establishment.  Even  though  a  majority  of  plaintiffs  were 
represented  by  a  lawyer,  going  to  labor  court  was  not  necessarily  expensive.  For  instance,  local 
administration provides a list of benevolent specialists (former labor inspectors, for example) who are 
willing to assist workers. Furthermore, low-income workers are eligible for financial help.  
 
The plaintiff or the defender can appeal the decision of the court if the stake is larger than a given 
threshold (about 5,000 euros in 2006). It is worth noting that 60% of the decisions were appealed in 




                                                 
6 Munoz-Perrez and Serverin (2006).   9 
In case of an emergency, a summary judgment can be made. However, these judgments are only 
temporary  and  might  be  overruled  afterwards.  In  this  paper,  we  do  not  consider  these  summary 
judgments.  
 
For any given case filed in a labor court, the range of outcomes is wide. A case can lead to a full 
tribunal hearing and be lost or won. It can be classified as null and void if the plaintiff has not shown 
due diligence in the conduct of her case. The case can also be crossed out. This crossing out is less 
severe than a “null and void” classification. The worker can reinstate her case at the point it has been 
crossed out and does not have to restart the whole process. This crossing out can be decided by judges 
but it can also be the outcome of the plaintiff’s initiative.
7 A case can either be conciliated during the 
conciliation step or outside the tribunal with a formal agreement sent to the court.  
 
The motives for suing are multiple. The nullification of a dismissal is asked in the majority of cases 
(58%).
8 21% of plaintiffs ask for some compensation that was not paid by their former employer 
whereas 9% of plaintiffs do not agree with the level of their severance payment. In this paper, we do 
not distinguish between these different motives. 
2.3  Recent Changes 
 
The legal environment did not change substantially during our sample period (1990-2004).
9 In the 
relatively recent past of an institution officially founded in 1806
10, a 1979 bill radically changed the 
institutional settings of the Prud’hommes. First, it extended the number of Prud’hommes across France 
in order to guarantee an equal access among workers. Second, it ended the majority rule for electing 
representatives which resulted in a more diverse composition of each Prud’homme. Third, it funded 
the  Prud’hommes  by  the  central  administration  (Ministry  of  Justice),  an  important  feature  in  our 
analysis since national principles ruled funding which entailed much less sensitivity to local changes 
in the economic environment. 
 
3  Litigation and Firing Cost: a Simple Theoretical Model   
 
We do not study here the theoretical impact of firing costs on labor market variables. This has been 
extensively examined elsewhere (see Bertola and Bentilola, 1992). We rely on these authors to say 
that larger firing costs entail slower and smaller adjustments than without costs.  We do not want 
                                                 
7 In 2004, only 27% of crossed out cases were reinstated.  
8 In a very vast majority of the cases won by the worker, the worker is not reinstated but receives a compensatory 
award. 
9 Apart from minor changes related to the application of the working time reduction and the 35 hours workweek. 
10 Prud’hommes can be traced back to the Middle Ages.   10 
either to understand why litigation exists whereas agreements “should” have been found between 
firms and workers. For instance, the model that we describe below has no uncertainty, no asymmetric 
information  that  would  explain  why  trials  take  place;  everything  is  known  and  predictable.  So, 
theoretically, firms and workers should agree on a payment in order to avoid the litigation costs 
(except if the costs for reaching an agreement are too large). Here, we try to illustrate how firing costs 
are related to labor court inputs and outcomes. To do so, we depart from the traditional model of 
litigation proposed by Priest and Klein (1984) or Bebchuk (1984) or more recently Card and McCall 
(2009) to run a cost-benefit analysis similar to the one proposed by Flanagan (1989) for disputes 
related to the compliance to the National Labor Relations Act in the US.  
 
In our analysis, the employer can deliberately choose to pay a minimal firing cost with the risk to be 
sued by the worker; or to pay a larger amount, which corresponds to the payment a plaintiff would 
accept in order to give up any further possibility of lawsuit. Important to note here that this last sum is 
not  negotiated  between  the  firm  and  the  worker,  but  is  directly  coming  from  legal  precedents 
(jurisprudence). In France, it amounts to one to two years of earnings. Another way of understanding 
the model is as follows: a firm chooses to dismiss the worker either for a personal motive, paying a 
small or even zero severance payment in case of a disciplinary case, or to dismiss the worker for an 
economic motive (redundancy) with larger severance payments. Our hypothesis, then, is that when 
firms pay the severance payment corresponding to a redundancy, the workers never choose to sue the 
firm (indeed, 97.5% cases in our data come from dismissals rather than redundancies). When the 
worker goes to court after a dismissal, the firm has to prove that the case is a legitimate dismissal for 
personal motive rather than a redundancy.  
 
In the case of a dismissal for personal motive, the firm incurs a minimum cost (cm) if the dismissal 
remains unchallenged by the worker. This cost cm is lower than the maximum cost cM , which leads the 
worker not to sue the firm. Yet the firm has to take into account the probability that the worker files a 
suit, pf , the probability pc  that the case ends with a formal agreement in front of the judge, and, when 
the  conciliation  step  fails,  the  probability  that  the  worker  wins,  pw.  We  assume  that  during  the 
conciliation step, the judge tries to reach an agreement using an “intermediary” cost cc, given by the 
jurisprudence, always lower than cM. Note that in order to simply introduce the co-existence of a 
conciliation stage and a trial stage we consider cc constant. The firm cannot increase cc  in order to 
avoid the trial. 
 
Uncertainty of the process is summarized through pw. The firm and the employee share the same 
expectation of the output of process. This reflects the fact that the quality of each case is known by 
both parties and is related to observed characteristics of the workers and of the firms. For instance, 
union or personnel delegates or pregnant women are very well protected by the law, and the judges are   11 
very strict against dismissals of such individuals. Several past statements of judgments also show that 




If choosing cm the expected firing cost for the firm is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } ( ) m f t m w m w c c c c f c p l c p F c p p l c p p c E - + + - + + - + + = 1 1 ) 1 ( ) (  
 
where F is a compensatory award for the worker,  c l  is the firm’s litigation cost when the parties reach 
an agreement at the conciliation stage, and  t l  is the firm’s litigation cost when the parties go to trial. 
Otherwise, the firing cost is  M c . 
 
As for the worker, if the firm chooses cm, the expected severance payment is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } ( ) m f t m w m w c c c c f c p k c p F c p p k c p p s E - + - - + + - + - = 1 1 ) 1 ( ) (  
c k being the cost of litigation for the worker at the conciliation stage,  t k  being the cost at the trial 
stage. Otherwise, the received payment is  M c . 
 
The parameters pf  and pc  result from the optimization from the firm and the worker and equal one or 
zero. The worker chooses to go to court or not; and in that case to accept the conciliation or not. The 
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* *  
Assumptions: 
Condition (1):  t c m c t l l c c k - + - >  : the cost of trial is sufficiently large ( w w p p <
*  )               
 
Condition (2): m c c c k c > - : the gain for the worker at the conciliation stage is larger than the 
severance payment she receives in case of firing for a personal motive ( w w p p < ).  
Condition (3): M c c c l c < + : the cost for the firm at the conciliation stage is smaller than the 
severance payment received by the worker in case of firing for an economic motive.  
Conditions (1), (2) and (3) taken together allow for the possibility of a conciliation stage. 
Condition (4): The compensatory award F  is large enough so that when the firm is certain to lose 
at trial, it is less costly to pay the maximum severance payment. That is:  t m M l F c c + + <  . It 
                                                 
11 Unfortunately, the data do not contain a firm identifier. Hence, it is not possible to directly relate firm and 
worker behavior.   12 
implies  1
* * < w p  and excludes an equilibrium in which the law has no deterrent effect, every 
worker being fired for a personal motive. 
Condition (5):  M t t c c c l k k c < + + - : there is a probability range for a trial to exist. The firm is 
better off at trial than paying cM. 
 
Result:  Under  these  assumptions,  there  are  four  equilibria,  depending  on  the  value  of  w p (see 
Appendix for a proof): 
Equilibrium (1): for small probabilities w w p p <  , the firm pays cm and the worker does not go to 
court ( 0 = f p
 
and  0 = c p ) since the firm would refuse the conciliation and the gain at trial would be 
negative for the worker. 
Equilibrium (2):  when w w w p p p < <  , the expected gain of the worker at trial is positive. She can 
credibly threat the firm to go to a full hearing. Since  w w p p <
* the firm accepts to settle with the 
worker. The settlement amount is lower than the expected loss of the firm at trial but larger than the 
expected gain of the worker. ( 1 = f p
 
and  1 = c p ). 
Equilibrium (3):  when
* *
w w w p p p < <  , the worker is better off at the trial stage and refuses to 
conciliate anymore ( 1 = f p
 
and  0 = c p ).  
Equilibrium (4):  when
* *
w w p p > , the firm pays  M c  since it would be too costly to go to court. 
 
The firing cost, depending on the probability of winning of the case, is shown on Figure 1.    13 
 
 
Fig. 1: Firing cost  
 
Discussion: We consider that firms are facing an invariant distribution of case quality. This model 
shows that changes in the “inputs” have intuitive impacts on the firing costs. For instance, an increase 
in the firm’s litigation cost at trial  t l  implies a decrease in 
* *
w p  (Figure 2). The firm will be more 
likely to fire high probability workers with an economic motive to avoid lawsuits. It will also increase 
the relative cost of a trial with respect to conciliation. The expected firm’s cost at trial will rise. All 
these changes lead to an increase in the firing cost, a decrease in the trial and filing rates. Hence, a 
smaller number of trials and filing cases appear to be associated (in some cases at least) with more 
EPL, in contrast to the usual view promoted by OECD that equates trials with EPL.  
w p  
m c  
M c  
( ) t m w m w l c p F c p + - + + 1 ) (  
* *
w p  
w p
no judicial case  no judicial case  conciliation  trial 
w p  
c c l c +  14 
 
Fig. 2: Firing cost, case outcomes and an increase in the litigation costs for the firm 
 
Let us study the following case that stands in stark contrast with the previous one (Figure 3). An 
increase in workers’ litigation costs kt will induce a decreased probability for the workers to file a case 
(through a higher w p ) as well as more workers that prefer to conciliate (through a higher  w p ). In this 
situation (contrasting with the previous one), a smaller number of trials is associated with lower total 
firing costs. In fact, our model shows that firing costs directly depend on variation in input costs; yet 
the link with case outcomes is ambiguous. 
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Fig. 3: Firing cost, case outcomes and an increase in the litigation cost for the worker 
 
The model can also be used to think about the instruments and discuss the endogeneity problems that 
we  will  face  when  estimating  the  relations  between  labor  court  outcomes  and  labor  market 
characteristics. For instance, an adverse shock on the labor market conditions can affect labor court 
outcomes. First, according to the legislator, F compensates the worker for past and future potential 
wage losses, in particular by taking into account the difficulty of finding a new and comparable job. 
The magnitude of F is therefore likely to be countercyclical. An economic downturn pushes  w p ,  w p , 
and 
* *
w p  downwards which results, other things being equal, in higher firing costs.
12 Moreover, if 
workers exert more effort on the job during a downturn (with an efficiency wage story in mind), the 
overall distribution of pw will shift upwards. Third, economic conditions might also alter the overall 
distribution of pw through judges’ behavior. Judges showing a pro-worker bias when labor market 
conditions deteriorate increase the firing costs faced by the firms (see Ichino et alii, 2003).  
 
                                                 
12 Empirically, Siegelman and Donohue (1995) find that cases of employment discrimination rise in downturns 
and are more likely to be lost. In our model, it means that the decrease in  w p  more than offsets the decrease in 
* *
w p  when computing the average worker’s victory rate. 
w p  
m c  
M c  
( ) t m w m w l c p F c p + - + + 1 ) (  
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Our identification strategy is based on variations of the legal environment across years and labor 
courts as well as within courts. These variations might impact case outcomes and the cost of procedure 
without being related to current local economic developments. First, labor judges and judicial clerks 
involved in labor disputes are unequally distributed over French territory, leading to differentially 
congested  labor  courts.  This  implies  an  increasing  marginal  cost  of  challenging  the  dismissal 
following Buchanan’s club theory of public goods and thus lowers the firing costs through higher t k . 
Second,  one  might  plausibly  assume  that  a  higher lawyer  density  induces  a stronger  competition 
amongst lawyers pushing down the cost of legal representation ( t k  and  c k ). Third, judges working at 
the Prud’hommes are union members (employees or employers) and their behavior is likely to be 
shaped by a long tradition of industrial relations adopted by their union at the national level and 
loosely related to local economic developments. For instance, some unions tend to favor agreements 
over  confrontation.  This  should  also  impact  case  outcomes.  We  will  discuss  more  in  depth  the 
exogeneity of these indicators in Section 5.
13 
4  Data Set and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1  Individual Cases Data Set 
4.1.1  Firms’ and Workers’ Characteristics 
 
Our data source on individual cases comes from administrative records made at the level of each 
Prud’homme  and  collected  by  the  statistical  department  of  the  French  Ministry  of  Justice.  Their 
primary goal is to monitor labor courts’ activities with an emphasis on speed of treatment. The data 




Apart from years 1993, 1994 and 1995, the number of cases treated by labor courts appears to be 
stable over the period, in stark contrast with what happened in some countries such as the UK where a 
sharp increase took place (see Figure 5 and Burgess, 1999).  
 
For each case, the sex and age of the employee-plaintiff is recorded. There is no precise information 
on her skill-level in the firm. Nevertheless, the “managers” section of the Prud’hommes only deals 
                                                 
13 In our approach, the congestion of the labor courts increases the cost of litigation which deters workers either 
to file or to refuse the settlement and therefore decreases the firing cost. Two recent papers by Besancenot and 
Vranceanu (2008) and Stahler (2008) relate labor courts to labor markets through the existence of “judicial 
mistakes”. The congestion of the court pushes upward the number of judicial mistakes. Bad type workers – that 
is workers that have rightly been fired for a personal motive -- have an incentive to go to court gambling on a 
judicial mistake. This is found under some assumptions – and contrasting with our view -- to have an increasing 
impact on the firing costs. 
14 We will not consider the 2% of cases involving employers as plaintiffs.   17 
with  high-skill  employees  and  managers.  Similarly,  since  low-income  workers  are  eligible  for 
financial help (13% of the cases) eligibility can be used as a low-income indicator. Approximately one 
half of these cases are susceptible of appeal,
15 which implies that the sums at stake are larger than 
5,000 euros (in 2005). 53% of the employees are represented by a lawyer.  
 
As for firms’ characteristics, we know the industry, the size, and the Prud’hommes jurisdiction of the 
employing firm (i.e. the industry broadly defined). However, we can only differentiate between firms 
with more and firms with less than 10 workers. The size of the firm has to be known by labor court 
judges because labor laws differ for small firms; more specifically, they are less stringent and try to 
ease the financial costs of firing that could hurt them irreversibly. Small firms are overrepresented 
with 56% of the filed cases whereas they comprise 25% of the labor force.  
 
For each case, the starting date, the ending date, the motives for dismissal, and the court decision are 
recorded. An average case takes one year (343 days) with a standard deviation of 9 months.  
4.1.2  Cases Outcomes Indicators 
 
Using the individual cases data set, we are able to compute various case outcomes indicators for each 
Prud’homme and year. A case can follow various paths and every grouping is somewhat arbitrary but 
we try to follow elements of our model as much as possible. We start by computing the following 
cases outcomes indicators using the most disaggregated classification:  “winning” (resp. “losing”, 
“null and void”, “crossed out”, “conciliated”, “agreement” and “tied”) is computed as the ratio of the 
cases classified as worker’s victory (resp. defeat at trial, null and void, crossed out, conciliated, having 
led to an agreement, having been judged by a professional judge) in year t over the number of cases 
disposed in year t. We then group cases in “agreed” (cases conciliated or having led to an agreement), 
“dropped” (“null and void” or “crossed out”) and “trial” (cases having reached trial), see Table 1. We 
also compute the worker’s victory rate at trial (“victory”). A simple logistic analysis using individual 
data is presented in Table A.1. 
 
About 60% of cases ended by a trial, among which 75% led to a worker’s victory (see Table 2). 
Despite the mandatory step of conciliation, only 11% of the cases ended at this stage. Taking into 
account cases that led to an agreement notified to the court or to a withdrawal on the worker’s side, at 
least 20% of the filed cases led to an agreement. 20% is also the proportion of cases having been 
dropped. All case outcomes or judicial environment indicators display a very strong variance over 
time and across Prud’hommes.  In comparison with what is observed in a country such as the UK, a 
                                                 
15 Unfortunately, current available data sets do not allow us to track the cases across the levels of jurisdictions.  
Whether the decision is appealed by the worker or the firm is also unknown. In 2004, according to Serverin and 
Munoz-Perez (2006), Among the population of appealed cases, only 15% were overruled.      18 
large fraction of workers and firms are represented by a lawyer despite other available means of 
representation. Despite the conciliation step which promotes a quick and costless resolution of the 
cases, labor disputes seem to induce important litigation costs. Our model help us understand the 
relative  frequencies  of  these  case  outcomes,  in  particular  the  often  low  value  of  k,  the  worker’s 
litigation cost and l, the firm’s litigation. 
  
Admittedly starting from a high base, we do not observe in France a strong increase in the number of 
cases brought to the labor courts. In absolute terms, the number of filed cases increased by 10% over 
the 1990 to 2004 period. The number of filed cases by unemployed workers hovered around five 
percent over the same period.  
 
A regression of the different indicators of outcomes on local measures of the business cycle shows that 
the case outcomes are strongly correlated with the cycle (see Table A.2) and that traditional labor 
regulation indices are highly imperfect in this respect. A high unemployment rate is associated with a 
high trial rate, a high winning rate and a small number of “agreed, conciliated, or dropped” cases.  
4.2  Local Employment Data Set  
4.2.1  Labor Court Level 
 
Local employment flows at the establishment level are computed from the SIRENE files, maintained 
at  the  French  statistical  institute  (INSEE).  These  files  give  the  precise  location  (city  within  a 
“département”) for each establishment. We compute a set of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) indicators 
over  the  1990-2004  period:  job  creation  (both  at  the  extensive  and  the  intensive  margin),  job 
destruction (both at the extensive and the intensive margin), and net job creation variables over the 
1990-2004  period  (using  Haltiwanger  (1989)’s  definitions).  These  measures  are  aggregated  by 
industry (service, trade, and manufacturing) and size of the establishments (more or less than 10 
employees) at the city level as well as at the Prud’homme level, using a 1999 correspondence between 
cities  and  Prud’hommes  provided  by  the  Ministry  of  Justice.  In  comparison  with  cross-country 
analyses, these indicators also show a high heterogeneity across periods and across the 264 areas.  
 
To measure local unemployment, we use the number of unemployed as registered at the National 
Labor Agency (ANPE) for each city as well as the city labor force as measured at the 1999 Census. 
Finally,  from  1997  on,  we  are  able  to  distinguish  the  reasons  for  losing  one’s job  (economic  or 
personal dismissal, entry into the labor force, end of temporary contract...). 
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4.3  Election Data Set 
 
The elections for the Prud’hommes are crucial in France - at least for the trade unions - as they are the 
only way to assess unions’ representative character at the national level. Over our sample period, 4 
rounds of elections took place, in 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002. For each round, we collected the share 
of judges affiliated with each union as well as the number of judges by section at the Prud’homme 
level. Union shares of votes are rather stable over time but display a great deal of heterogeneity across 
Prud’hommes (see Table 3). The number of judges did not change from 1993 to 2002 (see Table 4). 
Changes took place in 1992 and after 2002 (see Table 5). For the 1992, 1997 and 2002 rounds, we 
have the turnout rates and the number of workers who were enrolled in the electoral lists for each 
Prud’homme.  
4.4  Additional Judicial Data 
 
In France, each lawyer has to get licensed and registered at the Bar (“barreau”) in order to be entitled 
to practice. We know the number of lawyers registered at each “barreau” from 1996 to 2006. It allows 
us to have a local estimate of the number of lawyers by employed worker. As there are fewer bars in 
France than Prud’hommes (181 versus 264), we match each Prud’homme to the closest bar using 
shortest route distance and compute the number of lawyers available to employees depending on one 
single Prud’homme. Using the 1999 Census, the national average is 77 lawyers per 10,000 employees, 
going from a minimum of 14 (Creuse) to a maximum of 868 (Paris). From our micro data set on 
Prud’hommes cases, we are able to compute the number of workers who were represented by a lawyer 
by labor court and year. We observe a very high correlation (0.68) between the lawyers’ densities 
computed from these two different sources. Lawyer data cover a shorter period than other variables 
(1996-2004). 
 
In  addition,  we  obtained  the  number  of  “greffiers”  (clerks)  employed  by  the  Ministry  of  Justice 
attached to tribunals in the area of each “Tribunal d’instance”
16, closest to the labor court (“Staff” 
hereafter) over the 1992-2004 period
17. “Greffiers” are civil servants in charge of all the administrative 
tasks, which include assisting the workers in filing their cases as well as writing the judgment terms. 
Their allocation is centrally set (by the Ministry of Justice). 
 
 
                                                 
16 As there is more “tribunal d’instance” than Prud’hommes (460 versus 264), we use again orthodromic distance 
for the matching. 
17 Data linearly interpolated for 1993 and 1994.   20 
5  Identification Strategies 
 
5.1  An Instrumental Approach 
 
We presented in Table 1 our measures of court decisions, properly aggregated to have a simple enough 
view of a complex sequence of outcomes. As clearly appeared through the model analysis, these 
decisions – dropping cases, workers’ victories or losses, settling cases, going to trial, or the duration of 
a case – are ambiguously related to firing costs. 
 
In what follows, we try to examine the causal impact of these measures of judicial cases outcomes on 
employment flows. We first rely on instruments, derived from our model, that are likely to affect the 
various costs of litigation for the workers and the firms. They are described in the next subsections 
after having presented the simple estimating framework that we adopt. 
5.1.1  Estimating Equations 
 
We intend to estimate the following econometric model:  
 
t p t p t p t p t p t p Outcome BC BC Flows , , 1 , 2 , 1 , e g d b a a + + + + + = -                      (1) 
 
where  t p Outcome ,  is a measure of judicial cases outcomes at the unit of observation p and for year t. 
BCp,t is a business cycle indicator. The unit of observation is the Prud’homme. Our labor market 
variables Flowsp,t are the labor flows at the Prud’homme level. δp is a Prud’homme fixed effect; γt  is 
the year effect and εp,t is the statistical residual. In each regression, observations are clustered at the 
local labor market area level. The labor market areas defined by the jurisdiction of the Prud’hommes 
display a large heterogeneity in size (measured by active population or employment). Half of the 
Prud’hommes account for about 80% of the 1991 total employment. We weight our regressions by the 
1999 active population of the Prud’hommes area (results are unchanged when using total employment 
at the start of the period under review, 1991). Table 6 presents results of regression (3) with and 
without fixed effects using OLS. No clear pattern is apparent in this Table and, again, it is impossible 
to know if an increased number of conciliations causes job destructions or job destructions cause more 
conciliations in court. 
 
Therefore, to estimate the parameter β measuring the causal impact of the judicial activity on the labor 
market flows, we adopt an instrumental approach by projecting our outcome indicators on instruments 
Z , business cycle indicators, year dummies and local labor market fixed effects:    21 
t p t p t p t p t p t p Z BC BC Outcome , , 1 , 2 , 1 , u g d l m m + + + + + = -                               (2) 
 
Clearly, the business cycle BC is endogenous and also needs to be instrumented: unobserved economic 
shocks might simultaneously impact the quality of the cases brought to labor court, bias the judges in 
their decisions, and affect the labor flows. To do this, we instrument the measure of local business 
cycles (number of unemployed registered at the local employment agency on the 1999 local labor 
force) by the national unemployment rate (in the spirit of Bartik or Blanchard and Katz) using the 
following relation: 
t p aggregate p t p t p U U , , h m g d + + + =                                       (3) 
Then, we use the predicted value Û of U by (3) to compute our exogenous measure of cycle BC as 
( ) U U U / ˆ -  where U  is the average of the predicted local unemployment rate Û.  
 
5.1.2  Sources of exogenous variation 
 
Suitable instruments for estimating the parameter β must explain the average outcomes observed at the 
level of the labor court and be exogenous to current labor market developments. We claim that the 
institutional settings of the Prud’homme itself and the local legal environment provide convincing 
instruments because, as our model discussed, they are related to case outcomes by affecting various 
costs of litigation and because their variations within each Prud’homme are essentially random.  
 
a)  Lawyers 
 
One of our instruments is the number of lawyers enrolled at the local bar – lawyers of all specialties, 
not only those specializing in labor disputes, a small fraction of the total -- scaled by total employment 
of the Prud’homme area or the département in 1991 (“lawyer density” hereafter).  A high lawyer 
density is likely to reduce legal fees thanks to a higher competition (see Siegelman and Donohue, 1995 
for a similar argument). It also helps to disseminate legal expertise and judicial knowledge of labor 
disputes among the population of workers. It should correspond to a lower cost of litigation for the 
worker and hence influences the outcome of the case.
18 One could argue that the lawyer’s choice of 
location depends on local economic conditions. First, labor disputes are only a small amount of the 
total number of civil cases (11% at the national level
19). Second, in order to get a license to practice, a 
lawyer must enroll the local bar which jurisdiction the Prud’homme belongs to. This requirement and 
the building of a reputation and a clientele induce a low mobility of lawyers from one region to 
                                                 
18 Logit regressions using our data set of individual cases reaching the trial stage shows that hiring a lawyer 
against a unrepresented firm increases the probability of worker victory by about 4%. 
19 See available on line Info Stat justice (2005) « Une évaluation de l’activité des juridictions en 2004 » n° 80.    22 
another. Moreover, a lawyer typically enrolled the bar the city where she studied and her location 
preference is likely to be unrelated to the incidence of labor disputes litigation. Supporting this, lagged 
labor flows are found to have no predicting power on lawyer density including fixed effects and yearly 
dummies (see Table 7). Thus the lawyers’ density influences judicial outcomes through the cost and 
the efficiency of the litigation process but are likely to be random within a Prud’homme with respect 
to current labor market developments, therefore making it a plausible instrument. 
 
b)  Clerks and Judges 
 
We also consider as instruments the number of judges and staff in charge of dealing with judicial cases 
(scaled  by  the  local  1991  employment  or  by  the  local  1999  active  population).  Both  categories 
obviously  have  an  impact  on  judicial  decisions  as  well.  Judicial  activity  can  be  modeled  as  a 
production function for the case disposition. Benstock and Haitovsky (2004) using a panel data on 
Israeli courts find that judges complete more cases as their caseloads grow and complete fewer cases 
when new judges are appointed to their court. In the case of Prud’homme, the sociological literature
20 
supports this result and states that facing an increasing number of cases and having to meet some 
productivity requirements, judges tend to be more meddlesome implying crossing out more cases for 
administrative reasons to speed up the process and lighten their burden. Less judges or staff would 
imply more dismissed cases which clearly diminish the firing costs of the firm.   
 
Judges 
Prud’hommes’ judges are unequally spread over French territory. Before 1979 when the “Réforme 
Boulin” took place, the administrative cost of the Prud’hommes was borne by the local administration 
and their creation mostly depended on a bargaining process between unions, firms, and this local 
administration. For instance, in those years (before 1979), 6 “départements”
21 out of 95 did not have a 
single labor court. In 1979, a legislation strongly supported by the Minister of Labor Robert Boulin 
transformed  the  financing  and  made  it  depend  exclusively  on  central  government  resources.  In 
addition,  at  least  one  labor  court  had  to  be  present  in  every  zone  that  also  had  a  civil  tribunal 
(“Tribunal de Grande Instance”). Since then, every additional change in the number of judges within a 
labor court or the opening of a new labor court depends on the outcome of a bargaining between the 
unions, the employers’ federations, the local, and the national government. The process is supervised 
by a national agency (“Conseil national de la Prud’hommie”). This system generated strong rigidities 
with the consequence of essentially freezing the number of judges. This number stayed roughly the 
same since 1979; every bargaining party preferring the status-quo.  
 
                                                 
20 See Bonaffé-Schmidt (1987). 
21 As mentioned above, a French “département” is equivalent to an American county.   23 
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the dispersion of the Prud’hommes across French territory. We compare the 
proportion of the judges working at the local Prud’hommes with the size of the local labor market in 
1992 (Figure 6, with Figure 7 eliminating the 6 largest Prud’hommes). For similar labor market sizes, 
the number of judges in some Prud’hommes is twice that found in other Prud’hommes. Turning to 
labor court activity, we plot in Figure 8 the average number of cases disposed every year by judges, a 
measure of their productivity. Hence, in some Prud’hommes, judges deal with 10 times more cases 
than judges in other Prud’hommes.  
 
Judges are elected in December. As mentioned earlier, changes in their numbers and allocation across 
Prud’hommes took place in 1992 (in comparison with 1987) and in 2002 (see again Tables 4 and 5). 
Digging into administrative archives of the French Ministry of Labor, the number of cases brought to 
labor courts seems to be the main apparent quantitative indicator used to decide these changes.
22 Thus, 
nine labor courts were closed in 1992 because less than 100 cases were examined in a year. However, 
not all labor courts with less than 100 cases a year were closed. Figure 9 also shows that, along a very 
wide range of judges’ productivity, no change took place (30 cases a year per judge being a rough 
threshold for an increase in the number of judges). Besides, lags of labor flows are unable to predict 
the change in the number of judges that occurred in 1993.
23 We try to give a sense of what might go on 
in the next paragraphs.  
 
As explained before, labor courts are divided into 4 “sections” according to the industry of the firm 
(Agriculture, Retail Trade, Manufacturing, Services) and a fifth section for the “Cadres” (engineers, 
managers, and executives), see Table 8. We essentially do not examine Agricultural sections. Labor 
court elections in France are the only way to gauge the representative character of a union and are 
critical  for  them.  CGT,  the  most  important  union  in  France,  is  traditionally  well  represented  in 
manufacturing  and  is  reluctant  to  accept  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  judges  allocated  to  the 
manufacturing  section,  even  if  the  share  of  workers  employed  in  the  manufacturing  industry  has 
declined in the geographical area.
24 To illustrate this point, we regress (using 1993 data) the local 
share of judges in a given section on the corresponding share of local employment (see Table 9). We 
clearly see that there is no significant association between these shares in manufacturing and that the 
service industry is locally under-represented. Because the number of judges, as shown above, did not 
change at all between 1993 and 2002, our analysis will focus exclusively on this period. 
 
  Clerks 
                                                 
22 In the US, the Administrative Office of the United States Court uses statistics over the average time spent by 
judges to handle a case of a given type to give an appraisal of judge allocation.  
23 Results are available from the authors. 
24 However, some judges were reallocated from a section to another in 2002, mostly from “Agriculture” and 
“Manufacturing” to “Trade” and “Services”.   24 
In the vein of our lawyer density indicator, we consider the total number of civil servants from the 
ministry of justice working at the civil court independently of the type of cases they deal with. Their 
allocation  planned  at  the  national  level  responds  to  budget  constraints  and  changes  in  the  local 
caseload. At stressed before, Prud’hommes’ cases represent a small share of the total civil case load 
and their steady number across the years is unlikely to have driven massive reallocations of judicial 
personnel. We check again that the clerks’ density cannot be predicted by lagged labor flows (see 
again Table 7). 
 
The judge and staff densities influence the disposition of the cases through a congestion effect. Their 
allocation depends on institutional settings which generate outcomes that seem largely disconnected 
from  local  economic  developments  and  let  us  think  that  they  offer  the  characteristics  of  good 
instruments. 
 
c)  Union shares of votes 
 
We also use as instrument the share of judges working at the local labor court and affiliated to one of 
the unions running for the Prud’hommes elections. The union color of the Prud’homme is likely to 
influence  the  judicial  outcomes.  Prud’hommes  elections  in  France  are  keys  to  determine  the 
representative  character  of  each  union  among  the  labor  force.  A  large  share  of  votes  increases 
bargaining power at the firm and the national level. For instance, over the period under review, a share 
larger than five percent at the national level was a necessary condition to allow a union to take office 
in a firm with more than 50 employees and this irrespectively of the representative nature of the union 
at  the  firm  level.  The  political  platforms  of  the  unions  for  these  elections  are  their  bargaining 
behaviors. CGT is often perceived as a hard line union with a strong political left ideology and is less 
prone to negotiate: the CGT leader was a member of the central committee of the communist party 
until 2001. From 1995 to 2004, the CGT signed on average one third of the collective agreements at 
the industry level against around seventy percent for the CFDT sixty percent for the CFTC
25. CFDT 
and CFTC are known as softer and more likely to conciliate. One could argue that facing a higher 
probability to lose their jobs workers would tend to vote for hard line unions. First, it would imply that 
every worker’s opinion is to favor clash over dialogue to obtain what they want. Second, as shown by 
Andolfatto (1988) the map of union votes in France overlaps the map of political votes and is more 
related to traditional culture and local industrial history than to current economic conditions. The 
moderate Western France is characterized by a high turnout in favor of CFDT and CFTC and contrasts 
with left-wing territories from the south west and the north voting for CGT. Third, we showed that the 
institutional setting of the Prud’homme generates some discrepancies (to put it mildly) between the 
                                                 
25 See page 63 « La négociation interprofessionnelle en 2004» part 2, page 63.Rapport du Ministère du Travail. 
Available on line at http://www.travail-solidarite.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/NC_2004_-_2_La_negociation-2.pdf.   25 
local  Prud’homme  characteristics  and  the  local  economy  characteristics.  Judges’  behavior  being 
determined by their union affiliation and the share of local votes being independent of current local 
economic developments –remember that an election takes place only every five years -- let us think 
that union color can instrument convincingly judicial activity, again within a Prud’homme.  
 
Notice the variety of origins of our instruments: “staff” comes from the allocation by the central 
government of civil servants into local jurisdictions, “judges” and the union colors at the Prud’homme 
are  set  by  the  institutional  settings  of  the  Prud’hommes  and  the  structure  of  industrial  relations, 
“lawyers” is related to location preferences of the lawyers. 
5.1.3  Results 
 
Tables 10 and 11 present the instrumental regressions (first stage) for each of our outcome indicators – 
worker’s victory, going to trial, settlement, dropping the case, duration of the case, worker’s use of a 
lawyer, firm’s use of a lawyer – on the set of potential instruments, controls (year and business cycle 
indicators, appropriately transformed as described above), and Prud’hommes fixed effects. In Table 
10, we focus on the whole period (1990-2003) with a restricted set of instruments (nothing on legal 
environment). In Table 11, we focus on a more recent period for which we can use an extended set of 
instruments (on the legal environment as measured by lawyers and ministry of justice staff in the area, 
see  above).  For  each  regression,  the  variables  that  are  significant  (in  bold)  are  used  in  the  IV 
regressions. The F-statistics (test of the null of the equality to zero of the selected instruments) and its 
associated p-value are given in the last rows of the Tables. Note that no instrument appears to be valid 
for the victory indicator. When more than one instrument is selected, we will test the (statistical) 
validity of our instruments using the Sargan-Hansen’s tests of over-identifying restrictions. 
 
On substance, a larger judge density implies less dropped cases; when judges are “overworked” they 
tend to select the “best” cases and push the rest of plaintiffs (mostly workers) to abandon. Hence, 
dropping cases seems to work in favor of firms. By contrast, more judges (within a Prud’hommes 
court) are associated with more lawyers “helping” workers.  
 
The legal environment is captured by the population of lawyers in the area and by the legal staff. More 
lawyers (all specialties, not only labor) entail a higher filing rate. More lawyers also imply less trials 
and more settlements. Interestingly, more lawyers are also associated with more workers choosing to 
be represented by a lawyer, but not more firms choosing to be represented by a lawyer. This is not 
necessarily surprising since firms appear to use lawyers when judicial staff is missing (see last column 
of Table 11).  
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Finally, the type of union that is strong in the Prud’hommes has some effect on court outcomes. 
Increases in votes for Force Ouvrière (FO) tend to favor the use of lawyers by workers and act against 
dropping cases when increases in votes for CFDT, a modernist union, appears to decrease the duration 
of cases.  
 
5.1.3.1 Labor Flows and Court Outcomes 
 
The results from our IV procedure are given in Table 12. The first panel presents estimates for the full 
period  whereas  the  second  panel  presents  estimates  for  the  last  years,  1996-2003.  The  outcome 
indicators differ according to the period since available and valid instruments also differ by period.  
 
Through the results on job flows, we can induce which outcomes reflect increasing EPL, and which 
ones reflect decreasing EPL. Using Bentolila and Bertola (1993)’s very general result that an increase 
in separation costs decreases labor flows, we can deduce that outcomes which are negatively related to 
flows reflect increasing EPL.  
 
Table 12 shows that more dropped cases mean more job destructions as well as less net creation since 
dropping cases does not affect job creation.  Thus dropped cases tend to favor firms. On the opposite, 
Again, more settlements dampen job destruction when more trials increase job destruction: settlements 
are apparently working in favor of workers when trials appear to help firms. Because these two EPL 
measures have no impact on job creation, the effect on net job creation is of the opposite sign. More 
trials destroy (net) jobs when more settlements create (net) jobs.  
 
Workers are more often represented by a lawyer when the legal environment is dense (judges, lawyers 
of  all  specialties, or legal  staff  in  the court). This in turn  dampens job  destruction,  dampens job 
creation (second panel), but because the former effect is very strong, the net effect is positive. In 
unreported results (available from the authors), the fraction of firms represented by a lawyer has no 
impact on labor flows. Finally, lower cost of legal representations encourages the workers to file a 
case (last column of Table 11) and a high filing rate is found to deter firms from destroying jobs (last 
column of Table 12). 
 
Finally, our results can be summarize as: the fraction of workers represented by a lawyer, the part of 
settlements, the filing rate are indicators of EPL; on the opposite, the part of dropped cases and the 
part of trials are negative indicators of EPL. Whatever indicator is used, EPL seem to protect jobs: 
more EPL increases net job creation, essentially through a decrease of job destruction. 
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These results can be illustrated thanks to our model. Let’s consider the number of lawyers and let’s 
assume that an increase in the number of lawyers induce a decrease in the costs of litigation for the 
worker ( t k  and  c k ), the decrease being larger for the cost at the trial stage than at the conciliation 
stage. We assume that the impact on the costs of litigation for the firm is negligible (Table 11 shows 
that an increase of the number of lawyers has no effect on the part of firms being represented by a 
lawyers).  
 
Under those assumptions, the model shows that  w p  decreases more than  w p : more workers file a 
case since it is less costly, and proportionnaly more end the case at the conciliation stage than 
at the trial stage. Finally, the firing cost increases for the firms (Figure 4). This is coherent with 
the results of the first stage in Table 11: more lawyers imply a higher filing rate, a higher settlement 
rate, and a lower trial rate. It also helps to interpret the results of the second stage of our regressions. 
More lawyers mean more EPL and a lower trial rate. Thus more trials mean less EPL and more flows.  
 
 
Fig. 4: Firing cost, case outcomes and a decrease in the lawyers’ costs 
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5.2  Direct litigation costs and further investigation of the impact of 
judge density 
 
In the previous section, the impact of labor courts on labor flows has been assessed through the impact 
of court decisions, legal representations, and filing decisions -- instrumented by various measures of 
the cost of litigation i.e. judges, lawyers and staff densities, and union color. However, our measures 
of  outcomes  may  not  be  sufficient  to  describe  the  entire  judicial  process.  For  instance,  we 
unfortunately do not have any data on the appeal process. Besides, our estimations are done outcome 
indicator one by one ; we may miss some interactions.  
 
In  order  to capture  a  total  effect  at the  local  level of  our  exogenous  variables,  we  therefore run 
reduced-form regressions. We complement these regressions by exploiting some sources of exogenous 
variations based on institutions. First, because each Prud’hommes has a minimum number of judges, 
judge density and productivity will vary exogenously among the smallest courts. Second, because 
neighboring cities are often under the jurisdiction of different Prud’hommes for totally administrative 
reasons,  establishments  and  firms  located  close  from  one  another  will  face  similar  economic 
conditions but different labor courts, hence different judge density. 
 
5.2.1  Reduced-form equations 
 
First, we examine simple reduced-form equations of the total effects of judge density on job creation 
and destruction, including at the extensive margin. The results are presented in Tables 13 and 14. First, 
judges have a negative effect on job destruction in all specifications, resulting in a clear positive effect 
on net job creation since job creation is less affected by judge density. On the opposite, judge density 
have a strong and clear negative effect on the extensive margin: job creation is strongly, negatively 
affected by a strong judge density. This is consistent with our instrumental results: the first stage 
showed that more judges mean less dropped cases and more workers represented by a lawyer; the 
second stage showed that these two situations lead to more job destructions. 
 
Union color and administrative staff does not appear to be strongly related to job creation or job 
destruction. Finally, lawyer density is shown to affect negatively job destruction in consistency with 
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5.2.2  Using Courts Minimum Size 
 
Judges are allocated to the different sections of their courts (see above). Each section has an even 
number  of  judges,  at  least  four  representing  employees  and,  therefore,  at  least  four  representing 
employers.  This  minimum  number  of  judges  in  any  section,  eight  as  obvious  from  the  above 
description, is in fact quite a lot for many small labor courts, and sometimes smaller sections (see 
Figure 10). Therefore, a fraction of labor courts have four judges representing workers in many of 
their sections, often in all. However, we believe that we can use this minimum rule to identify some 
effects, which should be local and apply to the smallest zones.  
 
Because there is no variation in the number of judges among these sections or courts, we use the ratio 
of judges to the (active) population depending from this labor court at the 1999 Census, as a measure 
of  legal  cases  potential  (under)-crowding  in  the  court  or,  put  differently,  a  measure  of  potential 
(under)-worked judges.
26 We restrict attention to those sections having exactly 4 judges representing 
workers and estimate the following equation:  
( ) t s p t p p p c p t s p z x Pop Judges Flows , , , 90 , 1999 , , , , e g b a + + + =                               (5) 
where flows are job creation, job destruction, net job creation (both at the intensive and the extensive 
margins) measured across all cities depending from labor court p, in section s, at date t, where x 
captures the initial conditions before our analysis period 1993-2002, where  z  are control variables, 
where the ratio of judges to active population measures the judge density and e is a statistical residual.  
 
Results are presented in Table 15a. Each column corresponds to a flow, and each panel to a different 
section of Prud’hommes (as mentioned in the Data Section, it is not possible to compute flows for 
those workers depending on the “Cadres” section). The flows are computed using those establishments 
that depend on each different section, i.e. “manufacturing” only comprises those establishments that 
belong to the relevant industries. The control variables mentioned just above include year and local 
business  cycle  indicators,  1999  labor  force  and  1999  labor  force  squared,  1991  employment 
composition by industry and firm size, and 1991 caseload composition by industry and firm size. 
These control variables try to capture the initial conditions and the specificities of each labor court, 
observed as well as unobserved, in the spirit of a matching framework.  
 
Most  coefficients  are  negative,  some  being  significantly  so.  A  higher  density  of  judges  tends  to 
attenuate job creation and job destruction, a large fraction coming from the extensive margin (creation 
or destruction of establishments). The effect is particularly strong in the trade sections and is present in 
the services section. To check that the effects that we find are specific to these small labor courts, with 
                                                 
26 All results are robust to using other measures of the size of the region.    30 
4 employee-union judges, we present a similar regression in Table 15b with all 264 Prud’hommes. 
Results are clear. There is no significant coefficient. Hence, the negative estimates shown in Table 15a 
capture something specific to labor courts where judges do not have many potential cases to deal with.  
 
A similar analysis is performed for labor courts that have exactly 16 judges (four times four sections, 
manufacturing, trade, services, and cadres). The period and the control variables are exactly similar to 
those presented just above. Results are presented in Table 16a, in the top panel. The estimates are very 
similar to those for the analysis by section, with negative coefficients for all flows. There is no net 
impact  but  a  clear  impact  on  the  creation  (extensive)  margin  and  a  slightly  smaller,  and  less 
significant, effect on the destruction (extensive) margin. We perform a similar analysis, restricted to 
the 36 smallest courts, to focus on those on the left of Figure 10. Results are presented in Table 16a, in 
the bottom panel. The effects are huge and significantly so. Job flows are strongly attenuated in zones 
that depend on “over-judged” labor courts. In order to check if the results were driven by a pure “size 
effect”  of  the  labor  market,  we  substitute  our  indicators  “number  of  judges/population”  by 
“1/population”  and  run  the  regressions  on  the  entire  sample  of  Prudhommes.  Table  16b  presents 
results  across  all  Prud’hommes  with  two  similar  specifications,  showing  that the  effects  are only 
present in the smallest Prud’hommes. 
 
Those results confirm that more judges is equivalent to more EPL. Job destruction are negatively 
affected but also job creation, resulting in no significant effect on net job creation. 
 
5.2.3  A Matching Approach using a Geographic Discontinuity 
 
The first analysis, just above, confirms that judge density can be interpreted as a measure of the 
strictness of employment protection legislation since it decreases labor flows. However, as the number 
of judges did not change between 1993 and 2002, some parts of the sample period were not fully used 
in our fixed effects regressions accounting for unobserved Prud’homme heterogeneity. Hence, in the 
next paragraphs, we take advantage of the geography of France to implement an approach based on 
geographic discontinuity that should help us deal with potential endogeneity bias that might arise if the 
allocation of judges depended on local economic conditions. 
 
France has more cities than the rest of the European community, added together. Hence, many cities 
are close one to another and, in most countries they would have merged at some point. For many 
historical and political reasons, this is not so in France. Hence, very close cities may well depend on 
different labor courts, either between “départements” or within “départements” (a département is an 
administrative  unit  roughly  corresponding  to  an  American  county,  there  are  100  département  in   31 
metropolitan France). Among the population of the 36,562 cities of metropolitan France, we match 
each city with its closest and second closest neighbors according to the orthodromic distance (shortest 
distance).  We  select  the  matches  where  both  cities  do  not  belong  to  the  same  Prud’hommes 
jurisdictions (3,993 cities). We focus on the period over which there has been absolutely no change in 
the number of judges (1993-2002). We match our database of selected cities with our INSEE Sirene 
files that provide labor flows at the city level. About 14% of the selected cities did not experience any 
labor flows over the period because (private) total employment was nil. 76% are present over the 
whole period. Hence our final sample comprises 3,109 cities. The selected cities are very close: the 
last centile being at 7,8 km and the average distance being equal to 3,6 km. In 1999, the median 
population of these cities is approximately 400 inhabitants. Each Prud’hommes is at least represented 
by  one  match  in  our  data  set,  the  maximum  being  for  the  Prud’hommes  of  the  city  of  Tours 
represented by 24 matches. 
 
We estimate the following equation: 
( ) t cc t p p p p t p c t p c Emp Judges Emp Judges Flows Flows , ' ' , 1991 ' , 1991 , ' , ' , , / / e d a + + - = -                    (6) 
where c and c’ are the matched cities and “judges” is the judge density of the jurisdiction of the 
Prud’homme  they  belong  to.  dt  are  year  dummies.  We  do  not  apply  any  weight  and  cluster  the 
observation at the level of the match. Tables 17 and 18 present the estimates. In Table 17, we restrict 
attention to cities with less than 5,000 inhabitants. Table 18 includes all cities. Consistent with our 
previous results, a higher judge density reduces job flows. Yet, on those cities, there is no effect on job 
destruction. More judges decrease job creation, in particular on the extensive margin. The net outcome 
is also negative. It is plausible that the effects on the frontier of the Prud’hommes areas are specific: in 
those cities, it is easier for a firm to move to the closest area in order to find more lenient judicial 
environment. This can explain why the effect can be seen on the extensive creation margins. 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
This article examines the impact of the enforcement of the Employment Protection Legislation on 
labour markets for France using an original data set of individual labour disputes brought to court over 
the  years  1990  to  2003.  First,  we  present  a  simple  theoretical  model  showing  that  judicial  case 
outcomes are difficult to interpret in terms of EPL. The clearest example is the fraction of cases that 
go to trials. Firms faced with low litigation costs may well prefer to fire their personnel for personal 
motive and risk litigation rather than to fire them for economic motives, avoid lawsuits but pay a large 
separation cost. In this situation, more trials is induced by lower firing costs. Workers faced with low 
litigation costs are more likely to sue the firm. More trials is now induced by higher firing costs.  
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Second,  we  exploit  our  model  as  well  as  the  French  institutional  setting  and  the  local  legal 
environment to generate instruments for these endogenous outcomes. Using these instruments, we 
show that labor courts decisions have a causal effect on labor flows. More dropped cases and more 
trials  cause  more job  destructions:  more  trials indeed  are  a sign  of lower separation costs. More 
settlements, higher filing rates, a larger fraction of workers represented at trial, large lawyer density 
dampen job destruction. A larger judge density causes less job creation, in particular on the extensive 
margin. 
 
Hence, the web of legislations and the variety of local situations affect the enforcement of legislation 
and legal outcomes. The nature of real EPL is likely to be the product (or the sum) of multiple effects. 
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Model Appendix: 
The employer dismisses the worker at the minimum cost, instead of paying the maximum severance 
payments, if:  
( ) ( ) [ ] { } ( ) M m f t m w m w c c c c f c c p l c p F c p p l c p p < - + + - + + - + + 1 1 ) 1 ( ) (  
As for the worker, she chooses to challenge her dismissal ( 1 = f p ) if her expected gain at trial or at 
the conciliation stage is larger than the minimum severance payment:  
( ) ( ) m t m w m w c k c p F c p > - - + + 1  or  m c c c k c > -  
 
Thus  the  worker  chooses  to  go  to  court  if  the  gain  at  trial  is  large  enough 





w w = >   ).  The  worker  would  prefer  the 
agreement ( 1 = c p ) than the trial when ( ) ( ) c c t m w m w k c k c p F c p - < - - + + 1 , i.e. 
F
k k c c
p p
c t m c
w w
- + -
= <  
Yet the firm can refuse the agreement. 
 
On the firm side, the firm dismisses the worker offering the minimum cost if:  









* *  
 
We assume that the compensatory award  F  is large enough so that when the firm is certain to lose at 
trial, it is less costly to pay the maximum severance payment. That is:  t m M l F c c + + <  and thus 
. 1
* * < w p  
 
In addition, the firm accepts the conciliation only if it is less costly than going to trial, that is: 
( ) ( ) c c t m w m w l c l c p F c p + > + - + + 1  
which means:  
F
l l c c
p p






In order a conciliation to exist, suing must be a credible threat to the employer. Therefore, we impose 
that  w w p p <
* that  is  t t c m c l k l c c + < + - .  In  addition,  there  must  a  probability  range  where  the 
worker is better off to conciliate than going to trial. We must have  w w p p < that is  c c m k c c - < .  
 
Finally, for the trial stage to exist, the firm must be better off in some probability range to go to trial 
rather than giving the compensatory award cM that protects against any suing : 
* *
w w p p < .  
 
Under these assumptions we end up with four equilibria: 
-  0 = f p
 
and  0 = c p  if  w w p p <    
-  1 = f p
 
and  1 = c p  if  w w w p p p < <   (with  w w p p <
*  ) 
- 1 = f p
 
and  0 = c p  if    
* *
w w w p p p < <  
- the firm pays  M c if 
* *
w w p p >    36 
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Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Justice. 
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Dropped (Null and Void +Crossed Out)/(Total number of cases)
Settled (Conciliation +Agreement)/(Total number of cases)
Trial (Winning+Losing)/(Total Number of Cases)
Victory (Winning)/(Winning +Losing) 
Duration Duration (in days) of the legal process from the filing of the case to the its classification
Filing  Number of cases filed over number of unemployed 
Worker Lawyer Number of cases where the worker is represented by a lawyer over the total number of cases
Firm Lawyer Number of cases where the firm is represented by a lawyer over the total number of cases
Notes: These variables are computed at the labor court level (Prud'hommes)
Table 1 : Case outcomes: definition of variables
 
 
Case Outcome Mean* Std. Min Max
Dropped 0.20 0.09 0.00 0.75
Agreed 0.20 0.09 0.00 0.81
Trial 0.60 0.10 0.13 0.95
Victory 0.75 0.09 0.00 1.00
Duration  258 81 48 1037
Filing  0.04 0.03 0.003 0.33
Worker Lawyer 0.43 0.15 0.00 0.95
Firm Lawyer 0.58 0.15 0.00 0.95
Table 2: Summary statistics: case outcomes
Notes: we first compute the proportion of cases with outcomes i in year t at the
Prud’hommes level using the data set of individual cases collected from 1990 to 2004
by the French Ministry of Justice. We then take the means of these proportions over
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Union Mean Std Min. Max.
CGT 37% 11% 0% 71%
CFDT 28% 10% 0% 63%
FO 22% 7% 0% 50%
CFE-CGC 8% 4% 0% 21%
CFTC 4% 6% 0% 44%
Note: Number of observations: 1,056 (264 Prud’hommes over 4 electoral terms)
Sources: French Ministry of Labor





Number of judges in 1987 1992/1987 1997/1992 2002/1997
Manufacturing 2 213 -15 0 -9
Service 1 266 0 0 11
Trade 1 831 5 0 1
Management 1 278 10 0 4
Total 6 588 -1 0 1
Change in % between term t and term t-1 (t/t-1)
Sources: French Ministry of Labor.





Manufacturing Service Trade Manufacturing Service Trade
lost 3 judges or more 17 4 4 7 0 0
lost 2 judges 17 0 0 8 0 0
lost 1 judges 16 2 6 27 1 25
no change 44 85 58 56 79 58
gained 1 judges 3 5 17 1 9 9
gained 2 judges 1 2 10 1 5 3
gained 3 judges or more 1 2 6 0 6 4
100 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: French Ministry of Labor.
Table 5: Breakdown of change in the number of judges across the 264 Prud’hommes
1992 Election 2002 Election









drop 0.004 0.106*** -0.011 0.116*** -0.015 0.010
(0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011)
R
2 0.33 0.29 0.46 0.36 0.51 0.48
conci -0.030* -0.097*** 0.007 -0.105*** 0.037** -0.008
(0.018) (0.022) (0.012) (0.022) (0.017) (0.013)
R
2 0.34 0.28 0.46 0.35 0.52 0.48
trial 0.018 -0.015 0.003 -0.017 -0.015 -0.002
(0.013) (0.018) (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010)
R
2 0.33 0.25 0.46 0.32 0.51 0.48
win 0.000 0.001 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.008
(0.012) (0.017) (0.009) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011)
R
2 0.33 0.29 0.46 0.36 0.51 0.48
duration -0.010 0.038*** -0.001 0.047*** 0.009 0.010***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
R
2 0.34 0.31 0.46 0.40 0.51 0.49
lawyer -0.019 0.057*** -0.002 0.080*** 0.018 0.022***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008)
R
2 0.34 0.28 0.46 0.36 0.51 0.49
lawyerf -0.019** -0.028*** 0.004 -0.014 0.023** 0.015*
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
R
2 0.34 0.26 0.46 0.32 0.52 0.49
Fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No
Table 6: Outcome indicators and job flows, OLS
Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
Observations are for 264 Prud’hommes and for the years 1991-2004 (3, 432 obs.). Each regression includes year and
local business cycle indicators. Prud’hommes jurisdiction 1999 labor force is used as weights. Clusters: Prud’hommes
level.
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Job flows from Sirene files on establishments.
Job destructions Job creations Net job creations  42 
Flows= Job Destructions
Judges Staff Lawyer Percent FO Percent CFDT Percent CGT
Flows (-1) -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0196 -0.0216 0.0342*
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0162) (0.0186) (0.0184)
Flows (-2) -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0076 0.0260 -0.0151
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0157) (0.0192) (0.0163)
R-squared 0.01 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.33 0.07
Flows= Job Creations
Judges Staff Lawyer pctfo pctcfdt pctcgt
Flows (-1) -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0211 0.0009 0.0413
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0227) (0.0226) (0.0280)
Flows (-2) 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0287 0.0095 -0.0207
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0209) (0.0228) (0.0214)
R-squared 0.00 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.33 0.07
Flows= Net Job Creations
Judges Staff Lawyer pctfo pctcfdt pctcgt
Flows (-1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003* 0.0262 0.0122 0.0019
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0218)
Flows (-2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0162 -0.0088 -0.0042
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0130) (0.0171) (0.0141)
R-squared 0.00 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.33 0.07
Observations 2904 2860 2103 2904 2904 2904
Notes: Robust standard errors are between parentheses.*** p< 0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Each regression
includes year and Prud’hommes and local business cycle indicators. Prud’hommes' jurisdiction 1999 labor
force is used as weights.Clusters: Prud’hommes level.
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Job flows from Sirene files on establishments.




Employment Judges Employment Judges
Manufacturing 35% 41% 53% 37%
Trade 47% 33% 36% 36%
Service 18% 26% 11% 27%
Table 8: Breakdown of judges and employment by industry
1990-1992 1993-2002
Notes: A change in French classification of products occurred in 1993. Proportion
are averaged out over the period under review. Number of observations: 264
Prud’hommes. Sources: Election data from Ministry of Labor. Employment Data
from the Insee Sirene files on establishments.     43 
Dependent variable: 1993 local share of judges in the industry Manufacturing Trade Service
1993 local share of employment in the industry 0.002 0.203*** -0.451***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.031)
Observations 264 264 264
R-squared 0.00 0.19 0.21
Notes: Columns (2) (3) and (4) display the regressions of the proportion of local number of judges allocated to industry i in the
national aggregate on the corresponding proportion of employment. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
Sources: French Ministry of Labor, Insee Sirene Files
Table 9: (Mis)allocation of judges by industry
 
 
victory trial settlement drop duration worker lawyer firm lawyer filing rate
Judges -16.973 93.737 30.897 -124.635** 162.462 301.183*** 26.946 -54.462
(47.068) (69.478) (61.110) (57.379) (167.446) (77.468) (114.942) (41.433)
Union share of votes:
FO -0.063 0.032 0.072 -0.104** -0.100 0.153* 0.123 -0.032**
(0.062) (0.068) (0.058) (0.052) (0.175) (0.084) (0.123) (0.014)
CFDT -0.042 0.011 0.026 -0.037 -0.381*** -0.006 0.123 0.025
(0.060) (0.055) (0.048) (0.047) (0.134) (0.084) (0.111) (0.016)
Others 0.024 0.021 -0.025 0.004 -0.191 0.075 0.068 -0.004
(0.061) (0.063) (0.038) (0.071) (0.116) (0.060) (0.081) (0.011)
R-squared 0.02 0.17 0.19 0.05 0.18 0.59 0.25 0.39
F 4.17 5.13 9.32
p-values 0.0165 0.0243 0.0001
Table 10: First stage regressions (1990-2003) without legal environment
Period: 1990-2003
Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Observations are for 264
prudhommes (3,696 observations for the 1990-2003 period and 2,112 observations for the 1996-2003 period). Each regression includes year
Prud’hommes and local business cycle indicators. Prud’hommes jurisdiction 1999 labor force is used as weights. Clusters: Prud’hommes level.
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Sirene files on establishments.
 
EPL victory trial settlement drop duration worker lawyer firm lawyer filing rate
Judges 268.440 360.177 -86.030 -274.147 1,190.945** 603.166*** 129.189 -54.462
(171.574) (250.752) (260.322) (207.048) (574.365) (218.819) (340.770) (41.433)
Lawyers 2.080 -8.558*** 8.083*** 0.475 1.878 5.655** -2.328 3.351***
(2.077) (2.795) (2.043) (2.258) (7.233) (2.745) (4.953) (0.428)
Staff 5.830 9.755 -10.059 0.304 9.276 19.746* -50.686*** 1.539
(6.477) (11.254) (6.962) (6.143) (17.676) (10.235) (14.797) (1.250)
Union share of votes:
FO -0.017 0.013 -0.047 0.034 0.079 0.096 0.186 -0.037**
(0.075) (0.093) (0.083) (0.065) (0.191) (0.094) (0.151) (0.016)
CFDT 0.071 0.004 -0.063 0.059 -0.241 -0.057 0.043 0.002
(0.082) (0.074) (0.068) (0.066) (0.168) (0.080) (0.135) (0.015)
Others -0.034 -0.004 -0.105*** 0.109** -0.194 -0.007 0.201 -0.021*
(0.048) (0.053) (0.040) (0.047) (0.182) (0.057) (0.154) (0.011)
R-squared 0.03 0.23 0.28 0.04 0.17 0.25 0.30 0.30
F 8.11 12.49 6.39 4.32 60.57
p-values 0.0048 0.00002 0.0003 0.0387 0.0387
Period: 1996-2003
Table 11: First stage regressions (1996-2003) with legal environment
Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Observations are for 264
prudhommes (3,696 observations for the 1990-2003 period and 2,112 observations for the 1996-2003 period). Each regression includes year
Prud’hommes and local business cycle indicators. Prud’hommes jurisdiction 1999 labor force is used as weights. Clusters: Prud’hommes level.
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Sirene files on establishments.
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Period: 1990-2003
Outcome indicators: drop duration worker lawyer
Dependent variable: Job Destructions
Outcome 0.540** 0.145 -0.275**
(0.25) (0.11) (0.11)
P-value Hansen J statistic  0.903 0.563
Dependent variable: Job Creations
Outcome 0.0204 0.0984 0.0297
(0.069) (0.081) (0.086)
P-value Hansen J statistic  0.933 0.972
Dependent variable: Net Job Creation
Outcome -0.595** -0.0469 0.305**
(0.27) (0.070) (0.13)
P-value Hansen J statistic  0.877 0.575
Instruments Judges, FO CFDT Judges, FO
Test of excluded instruments F 4,17 5,31 9,32
Period: 1996-2003
Outcome indicators: trial settlement worker lawyer filing rate
Outcome 0.834** -0.631*** -0.610*** -2.003***
(0.35) (0.17) (0.22) (0.422)
P-value Hansen J statistic  0.447 0.302 0.13
Outcome 0.137 -0.0515 -0.145* -0.338
(0.17) (0.10) (0.075) (0.318)
P-value Hansen J statistic  0.347 0.360 0.44
Outcome -0.697** 0.579*** 0.464** 1.666***
(0.28) (0.19) (0.21) (0.578)
P-value Hansen J statistic  0.606 0.356 0.46
Instruments Lawyer Lawyer, Staff, Others Judges, Lawyer, Staff Lawyer
Test of excluded instruments F 8.11 12.49 6.39 60.57
Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Observations are for
264 Prud’hommes and for the years 199-2003 (3,432 obs.) or 1996-2003 (2,112 obs.). Each regression includes year and local business
cycle indicators. Prud’hommes jurisdiction 1999 labor force is used as weights. Clusters: Prud’hommes level. Sources: Prud’hommes
data from Ministry of Labor. Job flows from Sirene files on establishments
Table 12: Instrumental Variables Regressions
Dependent variable: Job Destructions
Dependent variable: Job Creations
Dependent variable: Net Job Creation  45 
 
Job Destruction Job Creation Net Job Creation Job Destruction  Job Creation 
Judges -71.462** 10.824 82.285** 39.039 -70.831***
(31.972) (26.895) (33.501) (29.255) (26.189)
%union share
FO -0.049 0.010 0.059* 0.038* -0.038
(0.031) (0.025) (0.033) (0.022) (0.025)
CFDT -0.043 -0.017 0.026 0.007 -0.034
(0.027) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021) (0.023)
Others 0.014 0.012 -0.002 0.031** 0.004
(0.029) (0.015) (0.029) (0.014) (0.020)
R-squared 0.34 0.47 0.52 0.31 0,37
Notes: Robust standard errors are between parentheses.*** p< 0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Observations are for 264
Prud’hommes and for the years 1991-2004 (3, 432 obs.) Each regression includes year and Prud’hommes and local
business cycle indicators. Prud’hommes' jurisdiction 1999 labor force is used as weights.Clusters: Prud’hommes
level.
Table 13 : Reduced forms (1990-2003 period)
Extensive margin
 
Job Destruction Job Creation Net Job Creation Job Destruction Job Creation
Judges -505.162*** -162.724* 342.438** -78.941 -451.003***
(138.570) (83.110) (148.271) (67.615) (134.081)
Staff 6.951* -2.150 -9.101** -5.096*** 5.166
(4.153) (2.049) (3.539) (1.867) (3.857)
Lawyer -5.322*** -0.719 4.603*** 1.145 -2.602*
(1.190) (1.021) (1.598) (1.162) (1.469)
%union share
FO -0.075* 0.006 0.082* 0.017 -0.045
(0.043) (0.026) (0.045) (0.023) (0.040)
CFDT -0.048 -0.035* 0.013 -0.013 -0.026
(0.041) (0.021) (0.040) (0.021) (0.036)
Others -0.006 -0.006 0.000 0.017 0.012
(0.031) (0.014) (0.031) (0.013) (0.032)
R-squared 0.44 0.46 0.57 0.41 0.49
Notes: Robust standard errors are between parentheses.*** p< 0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Observations are for 264
Prud’hommes and for the years 1996-2003 (2,112 obs.) Each regression includes year and Prud’hommes and local
business cycle indicators. Prud’hommes' jurisdiction 1999 labor force is used as weights.Clusters: Prud’hommes
level.
Table 14 : Reduced forms (1996-2003 period)
Extensive margin
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Dependent variable:  Job Destruction Job Creation Net Job Creation Job Destruction Job Creation Net Job Creation
Manufacturing:
Judges/Population -64.493 18.031 82.524 -79.575 -56.727 22.848
(121.232) (73.253) (96.423) (107.581) (81.449) (57.665)
Observations 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010
R-square 0.30 0.26 0.33 0.31 0.11 0.33
Trade:
Judges/Population -194.916*** -199.225*** -4.309 -115.394** -139.818*** -24.424
(58.433) (45.972) (60.087) (44.085) (47.482) (48.228)
Observations 1060 1060 1060 1060 1060 1060
R-square 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.28
Service:
Judges/Population -181.742 -321.249 -139.507 113.258 -130.720 -243.978*
(244.481) (200.186) (169.938) (190.872) (189.402) (147.275)
Observations 2118 2118 2118 2118 2118 2118
R-square 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.25
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Job flows from Sirene files on establishments
Notes: we regress labor flows of a particular industry on the corresponding judge density e.g. the number of judges allocated to this 
industry in one given prudhommes over the 1999 labor force of the prudhommes jurisdiction. We restrict the samples of prudhommes to 
the ones having 4 judges in the industry section. 4 being the minimum required. Each regression includes year and local business cycle 
indicators, 1999 labor force and 1999 labor force squared, 1991 employment composition by industry and firm size, 1991 caseload 
composition by industry and firm size. Prud’hommes' jurisdiction 1999 total labor force is used as weights.  Clusters: Prud’hommes level. 
Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
Table 15a : Judges and labor flows in prudhommes with four judges, by section
Extensive margin
 
Dependent variable:  Job Destruction Job Creation Net Job Creation Job Destruction Job Creation Net Job Creation
Manufacturing:
1/Population 246.441 116.583 -129.858 136.046 64.657 -71.389
(198.145) (155.066) (134.044) (147.582) (131.240) (105.588)
Observations 2638 2638 2638 2638 2638 2638
R-square 0.32 0.36 0.25 0.30 0.23 0.23
Trade:
1/Population -30.238 -109.934 -79.696 76.918 -36.990 -113.908
(152.207) (122.446) (106.756) (118.170) (107.154) (92.665)
Observations 2638 2638 2638 2638 2638 2638
R-square 0.34 0.45 0.34 0.37 0.46 0.40
Service:
1/Population 246.843 200.275 -46.568 270.231 216.867 -53.364
(311.791) (267.214) (219.458) (260.250) (228.360) (184.067)
Observations 2638 2638 2638 2638 2638 2638
R-square 0.16 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.27
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Job flows from Sirene files on establishments
Extensive margin
Notes: we regress labor flows of a particular industry on one over the 1999 labor force of the prudhommes jurisdiction. We use all
prudhommes. Each regression includes year and local business cycle indicators, 1999 labor force and 1999 labor force squared, 1991
employment composition by industry and firm size, 1991 caseload composition by industry and firm size. Prud’hommes' jurisdiction 1999
total labor force is used as weights. Clusters: Prud’hommes level. Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
Table 15b : Judges and labor flows across all prudhommes, by section
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Dependent variable:  Job Destruction Job Creation Job Destruction Job Creation Net Job Creat.
Judges/Population -95.633 -140.585*** -44.952 -101.715* -131.723*** -30.008
(67.222) (49.106) (63.015) (51.558) (40.147) (38.164)
Observations 780 780 780 780 780 780
R-square 0.33 0.38 0.42 0.34 0.25 0.40
Judges/Population -2,022.797*** -2,585.602*** -562.804 -1,228.647** -1,613.094*** -384.447
(741.714) (684.681) (376.215) (561.737) (555.369) (252.943)
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390
R-square 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.32 0.23 0.33
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Job flows from Sirene files on establishments
Table 16a: Judges and labor flows in prudhommes with sixteen judges
Extensive margin Net Job 
Creation
Notes: we regress labor flows on the judge density ("Judges") e.g. the number of judges allocated to one prudhommes over the 1999
labor force of the prudhommes jurisdiction. We restrict the samples of prudhommes to the ones having 16 judges (top panel); 16 is the
minimum required. The bottom panel focuses on the 36 smallest jurisdictions among these prud'hommes. Each regression includes
year and local business cycle indicators, 1999 labor force and 1999 labor force squared, 1991 employment composition by industry
and firm size, 1991 caseload composition by industry and firm size. Prud’hommes' jurisdiction 1999 total labor force is used as
weights. Clusters: Prud’hommes level. Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%,
***significant at 1%.
 
Dependent variable:  Job Destruction Job Creation Job Destruction Job Creation Net Job Creat.
1/Population 75.239 -0.115 -75.354 47.985 -12.147 -60.132
(146.663) (117.206) (94.593) (109.845) (91.498) (71.712)
Judges/Population 12.234 8.346 -3.888 8.730 6.344 -2.386
  (9.597) (8.160) (6.254) (7.247) (6.438) (4.980)
Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Job flows from Sirene files on establishments
Notes: we regress labor flows on one over 1999 labor force of the prudhommes (top panel) and on the judge density ("Judges") e.g. the
number of judges allocated to one prudhommes over the 1999 labor force of the prudhommes jurisdiction (bottom panel). We include
all prudhommes. Each regression includes year and local business cycle indicators, 1999 labor force and 1999 labor force squared,
1991 employment composition by industry and firm size, 1991 caseload composition by industry and firm size. Prud’hommes'
jurisdiction 1999 total labor force is used as weights. Clusters: Prud’hommes level. Robust standard errors are between parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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Judges -0.328 -17.03*** -16.70*** -4.107 -17.85***
(4.93) (5.60) (6.02) (4.77) (5.30)
Extensive Margin
Table 17: Geographic discontinuity; labor flows and judge density
(cities with less than 5,000 inhabitants) 
Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, ***significant at
1%. Observations are for 3,109 pair of cities belonging to different Prud’hommes jurisdiction over the 1993-
2003 period (17,873 observations). The sample is restricted to pairs where cities are populated with less than
5,000 inhabitants. Each regression includes year indicators. Clusters: city match. Sources: Prud’hommesdata
from Ministry of Labor. Job flows from Sirene files on establishments. 
Job Destruction Job Creation
Net Job 
Creation
Job Destruction Job Creation 
 
Judges 0.293 -13.64*** -13.93** -3.147 -14.88***
(4.52) (5.16) (5.52) (4.37) (4.87)
Table 18: Geographic discontinuity; labor flows and judge density
Robust standard errors are between parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, ***significant at
1%. Observations are for 3,448 pair of cities belonging to different Prud’hommes jurisdiction over the 1993-
2003 period (20,274 observations). Each regression includes year. Clusters: city match. Sources:
Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Labor. Job flows from Sirene files on establishments.
Extensive Margin
Job Destruction Job Creation
Net Job 
Creation
Job Destruction Job Creation 
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Table A.1: Logit model for case outcomes 
Case outcomes 
   (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)       (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
   Settlement  Trial  Dropped  Victory       Settlement  Trial  Dropped  Victory 
   Representative Worker (Lawyer):            
Age (37-49):               Union  0.341***  -0.133***  -0.0896*  -0.0857*** 
15-24  0.154***  -0.110***  -0.0132  0.270***       (0.025)  (0.035)  (0.050)  (0.026) 
   (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.016)    Others  0.821***  -0.398***  -0.256***  -0.166*** 
25-36  0.0338***  -0.0253**  0.00329  0.130***       (0.050)  (0.046)  (0.085)  (0.049) 
   (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)    No representative  0.779***  -1.262***  0.902***  -0.296*** 
50+  0.0410***  -0.00302  -0.0306**  -0.0488**       (0.025)  (0.042)  (0.061)  (0.028) 
   (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.022)    Representative Firm (Lawyer):            
Gender (Male):               Managers  1.179***  -0.830***  -0.0186  0.127*** 
Female  0.176***  -0.0461***  -0.0951***  0.0698***       (0.042)  (0.050)  (0.038)  (0.034) 
   (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.0078)  (0.013)    Staff Member  1.124***  -0.786***  0.00778  -0.0717** 
Firm Size (Small):                  (0.048)  (0.033)  (0.054)  (0.029) 
Large  -0.0194  -0.0428  0.0570**  -0.222***    Others  1.042***  -0.604***  -0.200***  -0.0713 
   (0.047)  (0.030)  (0.023)  (0.034)       (0.048)  (0.045)  (0.059)  (0.072) 
Judicial Assistance Benefit   -0.462***  0.668***  -0.584***  -0.0125    No representative  0.664***  -0.925***  0.636***  0.725*** 
   (0.029)  (0.034)  (0.042)  (0.016)       (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.058)  (0.059) 
Juridictions (Unfair Dismissal):                Union Share of votes (CGT):         
Redundancy  -0.209***  0.180***  -0.0739**  -0.0947***    FO  0.139  0.145  -0.349**  0.105 
  (0.036)  (0.026)  (0.034)  (0.028)      (0.21)  (0.19)  (0.17)  (0.25) 
Severance Payment/Wage  0.0657*  -0.158***  0.135***  -0.0103    CFDT  -0.0643  0.109  -0.0576  0.378* 
  (0.038)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.028)      (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.22) 
Disciplinary  0.198***  -0.261***  0.146***  -0.304***    CFTC  -0.0659  -0.127  0.213  -0.201 
  (0.039)  (0.032)  (0.041)  (0.036)      (0.31)  (0.27)  (0.28)  (0.38) 
Bankruptcy  -1.128***  0.659***  -0.0716  0.247***    Net Job Creations  0.0369  -0.214*  0.243  0.207 
  (0.089)  (0.069)  (0.067)  (0.036)      (0.18)  (0.12)  (0.20)  (0.15) 
Observations  1055359  1055359  1055359  628396             
            Observations  1055359  1055359  1055359  628396 
Sources: Prud’hommes data from French Ministry of Justice. Job Destructions from the Sirene files on establishments. Estimation period: 1993-2002. 
*Column (2) to (5) display results from logistic regressions at the individual level where the dependent variable is the case outcome. “Judges” is the ratio of the judges at the Prud’hommes level over 
the local employment. Year indicators and Prudhommes indicators are added. The omitted category for each polytomial variable is in parenthesis. Standard errors are in parenthesis. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Cluster: Prud’hommes level 








































Sources: Prud’hommes data from Ministry of Justice. Others from Insee.
Each row displays the regression of an outcome variable on the current and lagged local
unemployment rate and Prud’hommes fixed effects. The local unemployment rate is
defined as the number of unemployed enrolled at the local branch of the National
Employment Agency (ANPE) over the 1999 census local workforce. Robust standard
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